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In Pursuit of Bigfoot: Confronting Oil and Gas
Mythology in Louisiana
J. Michael Veron
“I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but
how myths operate in men’s minds without their being aware of the
fact.”1
INTRODUCTION: THE CURIOUS FATE OF SENATE RESOLUTION 142
The connection between wealth and political influence is an
obvious one, and it is nowhere more obvious than in the state of
Louisiana. From at least the time of Huey Long,2 the adjectives
“wealthy” and “powerful” have been synonymous with political
influence in the Bayou State.
Copyright 2015, by J. MICHAEL VERON.
* B.A. 1972, J.D. 1974, Tulane University; LL.M. 1976, Harvard
University. Member, Veron, Bice, Palermo & Wilson, LLC, Lake Charles,
Louisiana. Former adjunct professor of law, LSU Law Center, Tulane Law
School. Member, Louisiana Bar. The author was lead counsel for the plaintiffs
in Amoco Production Co. v. Texas Meridian Resources Exploration, 180 F.3d
664 (5th Cir. 1999), Corbello v. Iowa Production Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La.
2003), and Amoco Production Co. v. Texaco, 838 So. 2d 821 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 845 So. 2d 1096 (La. 2003). The author wishes to thank his partners and
staff, as well as John Arnold and the environmental law firms of Jones,
Swanson, Huddell & Garrison and Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello for their
assistance in locating certain research materials. However, any errors remain the
sole responsibility of the author.
1. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, 1 THE RAW AND THE COOKED: MYTHOLOGIQUES
12 (1983).
2. Huey Long served as the Governor of Louisiana from 1928 to 1932. At
the time, he was prohibited by law from serving consecutive terms, so he
successfully ran for a seat in the United States Senate, where he served until he
was assassinated in the halls of the Louisiana State Capitol on September 10,
1935. Long was a colorful populist whose life and times inspired Robert Penn
Warren’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 1946 novel, All the King’s Men. Interesting
accounts of Long’s life have been written by LSU faculty members. The first
noteworthy effort was the 1981 biography by T. Harry Williams, Huey Long.
More recently, Richard D. White’s 2006 book, Kingfish: The Reign of Huey P.
Long, told the story again. Regardless of which account one reads, it is generally
agreed that Long’s political career was marked by controversy and corruption.
As one writer noted, the flamboyant Long was perceived either as a political
messiah or a dictator-in-waiting. See David Oshinsky, Every Man a King: A
New Biography Studies the Many Faces of Huey Long, Lawmaker and
Lawbreaker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at F9 (reviewing RICHARD D. WHITE,
JR., KINGFISH: THE REIGN OF HUEY P. LONG (2006)), available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/books/review/16oshinsky.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/AWZ2-C8UT.

1252

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Anyone demanding proof of that proposition need look no
further than the 2014 Louisiana Legislature. During that Regular
Session, north Louisiana Democratic Senator Richard Gallot, Jr.,
introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 142.3 The stated
purpose of the resolution was to request the Department of
Revenue and the Department of Natural Resources to work with
the Office of the Legislative Auditor to verify the accuracy of
payments received by the state for oil and gas severance taxes and
mineral royalties.4
The seemingly uncontroversial measure sailed through the
Senate on May 20, 2014, by a unanimous 35–0 vote.5 It was then
sent to the House of Representatives, where less than two weeks
later it failed to receive the required majority and was defeated on
June 2, 2014, in a roll call vote of 48 to 44.6
At first glance, one is hard pressed to understand how such an
innocuous measure could receive a single “nay” vote, much less 44
of them. The answer lies in the simple fact that the resolution went
unnoticed by the only interest group it could affect adversely when
it passed in the Senate. It was only after the resolution was sent to
the House that the oil industry’s lobbyists swarmed the lower
chamber and successfully lobbied for the required number of votes
to defeat the resolution.
The fate of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 142 is proof of
the political influence—indeed, one might argue domination—that
the oil industry enjoys in Louisiana. However, the defeat of the
resolution does not explain why or how the industry is able to
wield such power. Clearly, the rise of the Republican Party in
Louisiana, and across the South, has something to do with it. At
the time of the 2014 Legislative Session, not a single Democrat
held statewide office in Louisiana, and both legislative chambers
had Republican majorities.
But no elected official, regardless of political affiliation,
willingly admits that he or she is voting for a special interest
because of the potential for wealth or power. Like lawyers, all
politicians like to speak the language of justification. In other
words, they need to have a politically plausible explanation for any
3. See S. Res. 2014 Leg., 114th Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).
4. Id. at 1.
5. See Roll Call: LA SCR142 | 2014 | Regular Session, LEGISSCAN,
https://legiscan.com/LA/rollcall/SCR142/id/365533, archived at https://perma
.cc/35E2-VK64 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
6. See LA SCR142 | 2014 | Regular Session, LEGISSCAN, https://legiscan
.com/LA/bill/SCR142/2014, archived at https://perma.cc/F3CH-7DKX (last
visited Mar. 8, 2015).
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position they take. And lobbyists serve to provide legislators with
that rationalization.
That is where mythology serves a great political purpose. For
purposes of this discussion, mythology is defined as a set of
exaggerated or fictitious “stories or beliefs about a particular
institution or situation.”7 The role of mythology in law and politics
is not well understood, perhaps because it has rarely been explored
as a legitimate academic inquiry, at least in legal circles. But
mythology plays a powerful role in how the oil industry effectively
wields its political and legal influence in Louisiana, and it is
clearly a subject that warrants discussion.
As shown below, a myth can persist only if it is uncritically
accepted. In the case of the mythology surrounding oil and gas in
Louisiana, false beliefs continue to survive because their underlying
premises are accepted as true regardless of whether the facts support
them. Indeed, this Article shows that the evidence actually
contradicts, rather than supports, their factual underpinnings.
I. A (VERY) SHORT HISTORY OF OIL AND GAS
REGULATION IN LOUISIANA
Early efforts to produce hydrocarbons in Louisiana date back
to the 1860s. However, the modern history of oil and gas in
Louisiana began with an oil well that was drilled in 1901 in a rice
field on the “Mamou Prairie” in the community of Evangeline near
Jennings,8 ultimately leading to the creation of the Jennings Field.
From there, oil and gas wells quickly proliferated across the state.
The second oil field in the state was Caddo Field in north
Louisiana, which was created in 1906 and is the most widely
recognized.
Not unexpectedly—at least in hindsight—the infant industry
experienced significant growing pains, particularly in the form of
waste and contamination. Early efforts to control downhole
pressures were largely ineffective, with numerous “gushers”

7. Mythology Definition, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://www.oxford
dictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/mythology, archived at http://
perma.cc/SD5U-YT5H (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
8. For a concise history, see First Oil Well in Louisiana, LA. DEP’T OF
NATURAL RES., OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm
?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=48, archived at http://perma.cc/GY35-VBVD
(last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
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spewing oil across the landscape.9 Natural gas was considered a
waste problem and was simply burned with flares.10
It did not take long for environmental problems associated with
oil and gas production in the state to catch the attention of the
Louisiana Legislature in a big way. The state’s first legislative
response to environmental issues created by oil and gas exploration
and production activities was enacted in 1906.11 That statute
prohibited setting wells on fire and required gas wells to be
plugged and abandoned.12 Two years later, the 1908 Legislature
passed legislation forming an agency to regulate oil and gas
operations—the predecessor of what is now the state Office of
Conservation.13 Then, in 1910, the Legislature enacted a law
prohibiting the discharge of brine into fresh water sources of
irrigation during certain times of the year.14 This statute was
periodically amended until it prohibited brine contamination
altogether.15
Not surprisingly, the history of the state’s efforts to regulate oil
and gas activities over the ensuing century reflects a constant tension
between environmentalists and industry. The environmentalists have
suffered from a fundamental political disadvantage: they are a nonprofit interest group and therefore are neither as well-organized nor as
well-heeled as their counterparts, who comprise the wealthiest
industry in the world.16 This disparity is reflected in the number of

9. JOSEPH R. DANCY, OIL & GAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5 (SMU School of
Law).
10. For an interesting account of how gas flaring lit up the countryside
surrounding oil fields in the 1930s and 1940s, see generally J. MICHAEL VERON,
SHELL GAME: ONE FAMILY’S LONG BATTLE AGAINST BIG OIL (2007) [hereinafter
VERON, SHELL GAME]. Nearly 100 years later, the problem persists. In North
Dakota, natural gas produced from the Bakken Shale is burned while the more
valuable oil is conserved and sold. The flares of natural gas became so large
they could be seen in images transmitted from satellites. As a consequence, the
state’s regulators were compelled to enact flaring standards in late 2014. See
Brad Quick & Morgan Brennan, Inside North Dakota’s Latest Fracking
Problem, CNBC (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com
/id/101934384, archived at http://perma.cc/5JWN-L4BF.
11. Act No. 71, 1906 La. Acts 111.
12. Id.
13. Act No. 144, 1908 La. Acts 200.
14. Act No. 183, 1910 La. Acts 272.
15. For a more detailed history, see J. Michael Veron, Oilfield
Contamination Litigation in Louisiana: Property Rights on Trial, 25 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6 n.23 (2011) [hereinafter Veron, Oilfield].
16. See Economic Impact, LA. MID-CONTINENT OIL AND GAS ASS’N,
http://www.lmoga.com/issues-initiatives/economic-impact, archived at http://per
ma.cc/55FK-45LA (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
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lobbyists who represent the industry before lawmakers.17 The
success of environmental advocates has thus depended more on the
existence of a crisis or issue that aroused public interest and
attention.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to trace that historic ebb
and flow beyond the limited detail presented here. Instead, this
Article will focus on the current state of affairs in Louisiana after
more than 110 years of oil and gas production and exploration.
It is generally believed that Louisiana enjoys greater oil and
gas resources per capita than virtually any state in the United
States. To be sure, Louisiana is one of the top oil- and gasproducing states in the nation, regardless of population.18 Despite
that remarkable, God-given advantage, the state continues to rank
at or near the bottom of virtually every statistical category—
whether it be quality of life,19 education,20 or income.21 At the
17. See Dan Eggen and Kimberly Kindy, Three of Every Four Oil and Gas
Lobbyists Worked for Federal Government, WASH. POST (July 22, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/21/AR2010072
106468.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9468-HVKU. Information about the oil
lobby in Washington, D.C., helps illustrate the point. The Center for Responsive
Politics reported from public records that the oil industry spent $144.7 million, or
more than $396,000 per day, lobbying the United States Congress and federal
agencies in 2013 alone. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Oil & Gas, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=E01&year=2013, archived at
http://perma.cc/RL3F-BLQS (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). Another source reports that
three out of every four lobbyists who represent oil and gas companies in
Washington previously worked in the federal government. This is “a proportion
that far exceeds the usual revolving-door standards on Capitol Hill.” See Eggen &
Kindy, supra.
18. See, e.g., Louisiana: State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. & ADMIN. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid
=LA, archived at http://perma.cc/MFW7-WNQB.
19. CNBC ranked Louisiana second to last in quality of life. See Jennifer Leigh
Parker, Best Quality for Life in CNBC’s Top States for Business 2011, CNBC (June
28, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43344770#, archived at http://perma
.cc/VAP7-CD4D. A survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development also ranked Louisiana near the bottom for “quality of life.” See
Alabama Ranks Low in Quality of Life Study, TUSCALOOSANEWS.COM (Oct. 14,
2014, 12:14 PM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20141014/NEWS/141
019778, archived at http://perma.cc/YW5D-QPP3. However, another ranking done
by British professors gave Louisiana the top spot among American states for
“happiness levels.” Happiest Americans Live in States Ranked Highest for Quality in
Life, SCIENCEDAILY.COM (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases
/2009/12/091217141314.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/S9LZ-7Z3T. Perhaps
ignorance is bliss, after all.
20. The American Legislative Exchange Council recently ranked Louisiana
48th among the states and the District of Columbia in education. See Matthew
Ladner & Dave Myslinski, Report Card on American Education: State
Education Rankings, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/public
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same time, the financial press routinely reports record profits for every
oil company that does business in Louisiana.22
Thus, there remains an obvious question: Why hasn’t the state
shared in the massive bounty generated by the exploitation of its
natural resources? The answer to that question lies in an understanding
of the role that mythology has played in the oil industry’s exploitation
of the state.
II. HOW OIL AND GAS ARE PRESENTED IN THE LEGAL REGIME
Oil and gas activities attract attention in the legal system in two
primary ways. The first manifestation is in public law, which primarily
concerns the state’s efforts to regulate the manner in which oil and gas
operators drill and produce oil and gas wells. That law finds its most
pertinent expression in Title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.23
cations/report-card-on-american-education/, archived at http://perma.cc /UM27YF2H (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). The United States Chamber of Commerce
ranked Louisiana 50th in its most recent education evaluation. See Mike Hasten,
Louisiana Ranks Poorly in National Education Assessment, SHREVEPORT TIMES
(Sept. 15, 2014, 6:56 PM), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/education/k12/2014/09/15/louisiana-ranks-poorly-national-education-assessment/15694709/,
archived at http://perma.cc/QG7J-3GMK.
21. As one newspaper account summarized the state of affairs: “Louisiana has
one of the highest poverty rates, lowest median income levels and highest percentage
of people without health insurance, according to statistics released Wednesday by
the Census Bureau.” Jeff Adelson, Louisiana Ranks Poorly on Latest Income,
Health Insurance Statistics, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:20 PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/09/louisiana_ranks_poorly_on_late
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8TAQ-ZVH2. A ranking published by Forbes
Magazine placed the average income of workers in the two largest cities in the state,
Baton Rouge and New Orleans, 74th and 76th, respectively, compared to peer cities
across the country. See Jacquelyn Smith, The U.S. Cities Where People Earn the
Biggest and Smallest Paychecks, FORBES.COM (Nov. 27, 2013, 9:35 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/Jacquelynsmith/2013/11/27/the-u-s-cities-where-people
-earn-the-biggest-and-smallest-pay checks/2/, archived at http://perma.cc/G3L6KV38.
22. Despite the lowest oil prices in years, the major oil companies reported
record profits for the quarter ending October 2014. See, e.g., Bob Pisani, Look
What Lower Oil Prices Do to Company Profits, CNBC (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:13
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102113748, archived at http://perma.cc/3P3CSUEL; John Porretto, Big Oil’s Most Profitable Quarter Ever: $51.5 Billion,
ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=5503955, archived at
http://perma.cc/B7CW-BWQD (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
23. The primary regulations that govern oil and gas activities are found in
Statewide Order 29-B, which is promulgated by the Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources, Office of Conservation. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19
(2013), available at http://doa.louisiana.gov/osr/lac/43v19/43v19.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/F4VC-8SE2. Although virtually all other environmental issues
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The second manifestation is in private law, which primarily governs
the legal relations, both in contract and tort, between oil companies

are within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality, environmental issues caused by oil and gas operations in
Louisiana are not. Instead, they are entrusted to the Department of Natural
Resources, Office of Conservation. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29.l
(2007). At the same time, the Office of Conservation is also charged with the
statutory duty of “promotion and encouragement of exploration, production, and
refining efforts for oil, intrastate gas, and other hydrocarbons.” Id. § 36:358(C).
This gives rise to a significant conflict of interest that forces the regulator to
choose which of two masters—the industry or the environment—he should
serve.
This conflict of interest has manifested itself in lax enforcement of
environmental rules and regulations. On May 28, 2014, the Office of the
Louisiana Legislative Auditor issued its Performance Audit Regulation of Oil
and Gas Wells and Management of Orphaned Wells, Office of Conservation,
Department of Natural Resources. See LA. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, REGULATION
OF OIL AND GAS WELLS AND MANAGEMENT OF ORPHANED WELLS (2014),
available at http://app.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf/0/D6A0EBE279B83B9
F86257CE700506EAD/$FILE/000010BC.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F4VC
-8SE2. The audit examined the records of the Office of Conservation and
compared the agency’s performance with that of other states. See, e.g., id. at 3.
The legislative auditor found numerous deficiencies in the agency’s enforcement
efforts, including but not limited to: (1) the agency was granting unauthorized
exemptions from its regulations to operators; (2) the agency was not inspecting
the majority of oilfield sites with the frequency required by its own rules; (3) the
agency “did not consistently or timely address violations cited on inspections”;
(4) the agency imposed civil penalties for violations “infrequently” and often did
not collect fines when it did impose them; (5) the agency often did not conduct
re-inspections of sites where it had found violations to see if the operator had
corrected them or otherwise satisfied the agency’s compliance orders; and (6)
the agency “did not consistently issue penalties after re-inspections found that
operators with compliance orders still had not corrected violations.” Id. at 3–4.
Not surprisingly, the legislative auditor concluded that the agency’s
“enforcement actions may not be deterring noncompliance” after determining
that 63% of violators over the five-year period from 2008 to 2013 had failed
multiple inspections. Id. at 4. In all, the legislative auditor made 21
“recommendations” for reforming the agency’s deficient enforcement efforts.
Each recommendation listed the agency’s response. See id. at 6–33. The agency
did not dispute a single recommendation.
The 2014 audit was the third legislative audit since 2001 criticizing the
enforcement efforts of the Office of Conservation. An audit published on
January 5, 2001, entitled Water Quality in Louisiana determined that the
Department of Natural Resources was not inspecting injection wells in
accordance with its own policies. LA. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE
AUDIT REPORT–DEP’T OF NAT. RES., WATER QUALITY IN LOUISIANA (Jan.
2001). In March of 2004, the legislative auditor again concluded that the agency
was ineffective in enforcing its own rules and regulations. LA. LEGISLATIVE
AUDITOR, PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT–DEP’T OF NAT. RES., LOUISIANA
COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM (Mar. 2004).
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and landowners. For the most part, that law is collected in Title 31
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, which contains the Louisiana
Mineral Code.24
The principal focus here is on the private law issues raised by
oil and gas operations in the state. They are the ones that inspired
the mythology that lies at the heart of the industry’s efforts to
“reform” the law defining its responsibility.
Unless modified by contract,25 the primary rule establishing the
standard of care for mineral lessees in their operations is set forth
in article 122 of the Mineral Code.26 That article, in pertinent part,
provides:
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his
lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith
and to develop and operate the property leased as a
reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of
himself and his lessor.27
This duty to act as a “reasonably prudent operator” has become the
subject of litigation in three principal ways: (1) drilling or
production practices that cause premature loss of production and
thus deprive landowners of mineral royalties they otherwise would
have received (“downhole claims”);28 (2) contamination of soil and
24. See Act No. 50, 1974 La. Acts 237 (referring reader to Volume III of
La. Acts); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-217 (2000). The Mineral Code was the
product of more than 10 years of study, deliberation, and drafting by the
Louisiana State Law Institute before being enacted by the 1974 Legislature and
becoming effective on January 1, 1975. See John M. McCollam, A Primer for
the Practice of Mineral Law under the New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L.
REV. 729 (1976) (providing influential commentary on the Mineral Code).
25. The Mineral Code makes it clear that both landowners and oil
companies have the contractual freedom to alter their relations by modifying the
default rules imposed by the Code. Article 3 specifically provides that the
parties can modify the obligations set forth in the Code, so long as they are not
prohibited by or against public policy. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (2000).
Beyond that, article 122 of the Mineral Code expressly provides that the parties
can agree to modify the lessee’s obligation of reasonable prudence. See id. §
31:122. Specifically, it states that the parties “may stipulate what shall constitute
reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.” Id. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has not hesitated to enforce contractual modifications of the
default standard if agreed upon between mineral lessor and lessee. See, e.g.,
Jurisich v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597 (La. 1999); Magnolia Coal Terminal v.
Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991); Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.,
231 So. 2d 347 (La. 1969).
26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (2000).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Frankel v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 923 So. 2d 55 (La. Ct. App.
2005); Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters, 837
So. 2d 11 (La. Ct. App. 2002).

2015]

IN PURSUIT OF BIGFOOT

1259

groundwater that gives rise to landowner claims for the cost of
restoring their property (so-called “legacy lawsuits”);29 and (3) the
dredging of canals in the coastal zone that introduced saltwater
intrusion into freshwater coastal marshes and resulted in the
destruction of the buffer zone for storm surges (“coastal land
loss”).30
These claims are really nothing new. Landowners have filed
private damage claims against oil companies in Louisiana31 and
elsewhere for generations.32 However, the 2003 decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Corbello v. Iowa Production Co. was
perceived by the industry as a watershed event,33 presumably
because the court affirmed a $33 million restoration award against
Shell Oil Company for its contamination of a 320-acre farm in
southwest Louisiana.34

29. See, e.g., Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
30. The leading case in this genre was instituted in July 2013 in Civil
District Court for Orleans Parish and presents a claim against 97 oil companies
for coastal land loss. The case was filed on behalf of the Southeast Louisiana
Flood Protection Authority–East. The author and his firm are part of the team of
attorneys representing the plaintiff, headed by Gladstone Jones of Jones,
Swanson, Huddell & Garrison, LLC. The case was subsequently removed to
federal court and was dismissed on February 13, 2015. An appeal is currently
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Bd. of
Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.–East v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No.
2:13-cv-05410 (E.D. La. 2014), dismissed (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2015); see also
Nathaniel Rich, The Most Ambitious Environmental Lawsuit Ever, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/02/magazine
/mag-oil-lawsuit.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/X8D3-R8C6.
31. See, e.g., Duhon v. Buckley, 161 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
32. See, e.g., Marblehead Land Co. v. City of L.A., 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.
1931); Magnolia Petroleum v. Smith, 238 S.W. 56 (Ark. 1922); Hamilton v. E.
Kan. Oil Co., 173 P. 911 (Kan. 1918); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 37
S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1931).
33. Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003). The state
Supreme Court has referred to the laws passed since 2003 as “Corbello laws.”
For instance, the first post-Corbello law, passed in 2003, has been referred to as
the “Corbello Act” in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 240 n.7 (La.
2010). The Corbello decision continues to inspire substantial (and industrysympathetic) commentary in the legal literature of the state. See, e.g., Kaki J.
Johnson, Comment, The Migration from the Rig to the Courthouse: Oil and Gas
Legacy Litigation in Louisiana, 60 LOY. L. REV. 647 (2014); David B. Means,
III, Surface Owner Issues in the Mineral Owner, Lessee and Landowner
Relationships, 53 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 219 (2006); Mary Beth Balhoff,
Comment, Corbello v. Iowa Production and the Implications of Restoration
Damages in Louisiana: Drilling Holes in Deep Pockets for Thirty-Three Million
Dollars, 65 LA. L. REV. 271 (2004).
34. The award for cleaning up contamination was less than half of the total
amount recovered. The majority of the total recovery came from additional
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The size of the award, and the widespread publicity about the case
throughout the legal community, fueled industry fears that it would
soon face an avalanche of multi-million-dollar contamination claims.
Industry leaders quickly put an army of lobbyists on full alert and,
before the judgment in the Corbello case was even final, proposed
legislation “reforming” contamination laws.35 The landowner
interests responded with lobbyists of their own, and a crude
compromise was reached in the 2003 Session that altered certain
aspects of the litigation of contamination claims. Since then, the
industry has encamped its lobbyists at the state capitol during
virtually every legislative session and, with the support of Governor
Bobby Jindal, has enjoyed more success in changing the procedures
and remedies applicable to claims by landowners.36
Those lobbying efforts—and the rhetoric of sympathetic public
officials—have sounded certain themes that warrant close
examination.
III. IDENTIFYING THE MYTHS
Even the most casual observer of marketing advocacy recognizes
that the key to persuasion is a simple theme, repeated over and over.37
That propaganda tactic is apparent in the industry’s lobbying efforts
in Baton Rouge. The oil and gas lobbying theme has three distinct
threads:
1. “We need the oil companies more than they need us.”
2. “If we do anything the oil companies do not like, they
will leave.”
3. “Greedy lawyers and frivolous lawsuits are driving oil
companies out of Louisiana.”
These are the principal myths surrounding oil and gas in Louisiana.
Like the legend of Bigfoot, they are persistent even without proof.
Because of their impact on the legal process, they need to be tested
as all assertions are tested in the legal system: with a careful
examination of the facts urged in support of them.
damage awards for unlawful saltwater disposal and trespassing. Corbello, 850
So. 2d at 705–08.
35. See VERON, SHELL GAME, supra note 10, at 8–12.
36. See, e.g., Act No. 1166, 2003 La. Acts 3511; Act No. 312, 2006 La.
Acts 1472; Act No. 400, 2014 La. Acts.
37. “The most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless
one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly—it must confine itself to
a few points and repeat them over and over.” Statement of Nazi Minister of
Propaganda Josef Goebbels.
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A. Debunking Myth No. 1: “We need the oil companies more than
they need us.”
A consistent theme of national television marketing by the
major oil companies is the economic benefit generated by their
activities—particularly, job creation. A prominent example of this
has been BP’s television advertising in Louisiana in the aftermath
of the Gulf Oil Spill,38 which emphasizes the great economic
impact of BP’s activities. In the process, this advertising message
also plays upon the unspoken fear that, if the state is not entirely
hospitable to the oil interests, the industry will pull back its
business activities—the drilling and production of oil and gas—
and in the process, bad things will happen to the state’s economy.
Any reasonable analysis of this fear tactic should logically
begin by testing the assertion that the industry is a critical jobcreator that deserves special consideration under the law. That
suggests, at the very least, an investigation into how many jobs are
actually created by the energy sector as compared to other parts of
our state’s economy. A reliable source for this information can be
found in the governor’s annual executive budget, which lists
various job sectors in the state by industry.
Governor Jindal’s executive budget for the fiscal year 2013–
2014 lists ten different employment sectors.39 For “natural
resources and mining”—presumably the industry sector for oil and
gas—the governor’s budget figures estimate 58,000 jobs.40 In
comparison, the budget identifies the leisure and hospitality
industry—the sector dependent on the environment for fresh
seafood, good hunting, restaurants, and tourism—as creating
210,000 jobs.41 To put this into perspective, the “natural resources
and mining” sector is ninth out of ten employment sectors
identified in the governor’s budget in terms of jobs created.
“Leisure and hospitality” is ranked third.42

38. For an interesting discussion of BP’s advertising strategy for Louisiana in
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon Spill, see Cain Burdeau, BP Ad Campaign
Following Gulf Oil Spill Deemed “Propaganda” by Some, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 8, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/08/bp-adcampaign-gulf-oil-_n_1192600.html, archived at http://perma.cc /K2RJ-6AV2.
39. OFFICE OF PLANNING & BUDGET, GOVERNOR’S EXECUTIVE BUDGET:
FISCAL YEAR 2013–2014, at 5 (2013), available at http://www.doa.louisiana.gov
/opb/pub/FY14/FY14ExecutiveBudget.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EY79G56F.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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In simple terms, these figures would appear to indicate that the
economic sector that depends on a clean environment is responsible
for nearly four times more jobs in Louisiana than the oil industry.43
Of course, outside of television ads by the lieutenant governor, the
statewide official charged with promoting tourism,44 there is no
financially interested, unified economic force to speak for the
environment or pay for its commercials. If there were, it might
sponsor advertising messages that contamination and coastal land
loss from oilfield operations can potentially cost many more jobs
and cause far greater economic disruption than the prospect of oil
companies pulling up stakes for lack of sympathy.
Beyond that, there is considerable collateral damage caused by
oilfield operations in Louisiana. Neither the fact of the damage nor
its cost of repair is imaginary—and the best source of evidence on
that is not Greenpeace or Save the Whales, but rather the industry
itself and the state agencies with whom it is so friendly.
The industry’s literature has documented the environmental
disasters associated with historic oil and gas operations, particularly
its use and abandonment of oilfield waste pits. For instance, in 1987,
members of the petroleum engineering faculty at LSU authored a
peer-reviewed study in the Journal of Petroleum Technology—the
official journal of the Society of Petroleum Engineers—
documenting extensive contamination from abandoned oilfield
pits.45 The authors concluded that “[t]here are . . . about 12,000
abandoned pits in Louisiana that are suspected of chronic damage
to the environment and to public health.”46 Nor can anyone
seriously claim that this state of affairs was a surprise to the
industry. Its leading organization, the American Petroleum
Institute, began warning its oil company members about the
environmental consequences of utilizing unlined waste pits as far
back as 1932.47 In one paper, a leading representative of the
organization stated: “We are only ‘kidding’ ourselves when we

43. Given that Governor Jindal is an outspoken ally of the oil industry, one
would expect these statistics to be as favorable to energy as possible.
44. Office of Lieutenant Governor, LA. DEP’T OF CULTURE RECREATION &
TOURISM, http://www.crt.state.la.us/lt-governor/terms-of-office/index, archived
at http://perma.cc/E79C-CAJ5 (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
45. See A.K. Wojtanowicz, S.D. Field, & M.C. Osterman, Comparison
Study of Solid/Liquid Separation Techniques for Oilfield Pit Closures, J.
PETROLEUM TECH., July 1987, at 845.
46. Id.
47. V.L. Martin, Disposal of Production Division Wastes, Presentation
Before the American Petroleum Institute (Apr. 12, 1932).

2015]

IN PURSUIT OF BIGFOOT

1263

think we can dispose of salt water by solar evaporation from
earthen ponds.”48 Explaining further, the author said:
What we have attributed to evaporation was due to seepage
. . . . Eventually, such seepage may either follow an
impervious stratum to the surface where it may affect
vegetation or may find its way to fresh water sources, either
surface or subsurface, and in such quantities as to be
objectionable.49
The industry literature published further warnings from the
American Petroleum Institute, the Society of Petroleum Engineers,
and other recognized authorities over the decades thereafter that
storing brine, or salt water, in unlined pits contaminated subsurface
soil and water.50
For these reasons, Louisiana’s neighbors in Texas and
Oklahoma began to outlaw the use of unlined earthen pits as early
as 1955.51 Regrettably, Louisiana was unable to muster the
political will to do so until 1986, when the Office of Conservation
promulgated its first oilfield pit rules.52 Even then, however,
oilfield operators were put on the honor system to register their pits
and were given three years to close them.53 They were not even
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 8.
50. See, e.g., R.M. Russell, Environmental Liability Considerations in the
Valuation and Appraisal of Producing Oil and Gas Properties, J. PETROLEUM
TECH., Jan. 1989, at 55; Arthur J.J. Leuterman, Fredrick V. Jones, & John E.
Candler, Drilling Fluids and Reserve Pit Toxicity, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Nov.
1988, at 1441; Roy D. Payne, Salt Water Pollution Problems in Texas, J.
PETROLEUM TECH., Nov. 1966, at 1401; Henry Lewelling & Monte Kaplan,
What To Do About Salt Water, 31 PETROLEUM ENG’R, July 1959, at B-19; H.H.
Elliston & W.B. Davis, A Method of Handling Salt-Water Disposal, Including
Treatment of Water, in DRILLING AND PRODUCTION PRACTICE 122–45 (Am.
Petroleum Inst., 1944).
51. For Texas, the appropriate regulatory agency is the Texas Railroad
Commission. Its first order outlawing the use of unlined pits for brine storage
was issued in 1955. See Special Order Pertaining to Disposal of Salt and Sulphur
Water Produced Incident to the Production of Oil and Gas in the Rodman-Noel
(Grayburg) Field, Upton County, Texas, Oil and Gas Docket No. 7-32,629,
December 19, 1955. For a general discussion, see Ivan M. Rice, Crack Down on
Oil Field Pollution, PETROLEUM ENG’R, July 1967, at 33 (stating that Texas and
Oklahoma had outlawed the use of unlined pits).
52. These rules came in the form of an amendment to Statewide Order 29B. History, LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES., OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, http://dnr
.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=47&pnid=0&nid=2
2, archived at http://perma.cc/B7AH-CVBM (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
53. One industry expert, petroleum engineer Calvin Barnhill, described the
system as “self-reporting.” Dep. of Calvin Barnhill at 152, C.F. Henry Props.
LLC v. Apache Corp., (No. 10-18063) (2011) (on file with author). Presumably,
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required to submit tests regarding pit constituents or impacts on the
surrounding area—just to keep such information on file in case it
was needed.54
As the Department of Environmental Quality has recognized,
“[s]everely polluted water can be cleaned, but only at high cost.”55
Thus, the greatest challenge posed by the thousands of abandoned
oilfield pits is the enormous cost and difficulty associated with
cleaning them up. Left unattended, most contamination spreads
over time, which expands the contamination plume and in turn
raises the cost of remediation exponentially. Thus, even if the job
creation myth were entirely true, it does not come without a
significant cost.
Another environmental cost associated with oilfield operations
that is easily measured is the number of “orphaned” wells in
Louisiana. Under the state’s regulatory scheme, any well that is no
longer productive must be “plugged and abandoned” in accordance
with Statewide Order 29-B.56 The purpose of this procedure is to
protect the soil and water around the well by requiring that it be
properly sealed. However, only the last operator of record is
responsible for plugging and abandoning a well in accordance with
Statewide Order 29-B.57 Thus, if the last operator of record—typically
a marginal entity who took over the well after previous operators
picked all the “low-hanging fruit”—becomes impecunious, the well
becomes an “orphan” and must be plugged by the state.58

this is akin to allowing speeding motorists to report themselves to the state
police.
54. See Dep’t of Natural Res., Amendment to Statewide Order of No. 29-B
(Jan. 20, 1986). Amendment section 2.6(E) states:
Documentation of testing and closure activities, including onsite
disposal of NOW, shall be maintained in operator’s files for at least
three (3) years after completion of closure activities. Upon notification,
the Office of Conservation may require the operator to furnish these
data for verification of proper closure of any pit. If proper onsite
closure has not been accomplished, the operator will be required to
bring the sit into compliance with applicable requirements.
Id.
55. LA. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT DIV.,
WATER QUALITY STUDY GUIDE 1 (2005).
56. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, § 137 (2005) [hereinafter Statewide
Order 29-B].
57. See id.
58. Oilfield Site Restoration (OSR) Program, LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES.,
OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder
&tmp=home&pid=155, archived at http://perma.cc/4BRJ-7TJK (last visited Feb.
13, 2015).

2015]

IN PURSUIT OF BIGFOOT

1265

A fund was created for this purpose in 1993, financed in the
form of a fee on oil and gas production that is paid quarterly by
operators in the state.59 The fund is administered by the
Department of Natural Resources for the declared purpose of
“address[ing] the growing problem of unrestored orphaned oilfield
sites across the State.”60
However, the fund is plainly inadequate. As of 2010, the Office
of Conservation reported that there were 2,833 “orphaned” wells
registered in the program. Because of minimal funding, only 160
are plugged each year.61 Thus, assuming no new “orphaned” wells
appear, it would take 17 additional years just to plug the existing
orphan wells.62
Another consequence of oilfield operations is coastal land loss in
south Louisiana. In order to drill and operate wells in the freshwater
coastal marshes, operators had to dredge canals to reach drilling
locations. In order to dredge canals in those protected areas, they
were required to secure state permits. Those state permits—which
the operators were required to sign—more often than not included
a stipulation that the canals that were dredged would be maintained
and would be restored to original condition when operations were
concluded.63

59. The program is known as the Louisiana Oilfield Site Restoration (OSR)
Program. Id.
60. Id.
61. Louisiana’s Orphaned Well Program: Fact Sheet, LA. DEP’T NATURAL
RES. (June 30, 2010), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp
=detail&aid=17, archived at http://perma.cc/6VY4-C7YZ.
62. Id.
63. The permits are issued by the Office of Coastal Management in the
Department of Natural Resources. The agency publishes a “Coastal User’s
Guide” that explains the rules governing operations within Louisiana’s coastal
zone. See LA. DEP’T NATURAL RES., OFFICE OF COASTAL MGMT., A COASTAL
USER’S GUIDE TO THE LOUISIANA COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM (2015),
available at http://data.dnr.louisiana.gov/LCP/LCPHANDBOOK/FinalUsers
Guide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8GBD-FGCQ. The boundaries of the
coastal zone are set by statute and include most of south Louisiana below
Interstate 10. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.23 (2012). Permits to conduct
oil and gas operations within the coastal zone are referred to as “Coastal Use
Permits” (CUPs). They are a matter of public record and can be accessed at the
Department of Natural Resources. Copies of numerous permits for the dredging
of canals in the coastal zone are on file with the author. Beyond the permits
themselves, state coastal zone regulations also require restoration of oilfield sites
to their original condition: “Mineral exploration and production sites shall be
cleared, revegetated, detoxified, and otherwise restored as near as practicable to
their original condition upon termination of operations to the maximum extent
practicable.” LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 1, § 719(M) (2012).
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It is now estimated that nearly 10,000 miles of canals were
dredged through the freshwater marshes of coastal Louisiana.64
Those canals exposed the roots of the fresh water marsh grasses to
salt water from the Gulf of Mexico. The salt water killed the roots.
When the roots died, the dirt they held in place sloughed off. The
canals widened, exposing new roots, which the salt water then
killed as well. This cycle resulted in a remarkable widening of the
canals. Photographs over time show entire regions becoming
submerged. Numerous small communities in south Louisiana
disappeared. Despite the promises made by the oil companies in
the permits, virtually none of the hundreds of canals dredged
across the coastal region of Louisiana have been restored.
The extent of coastal land loss in Louisiana is well
documented. Between 1930 and 2000, over 1900 square miles
disappeared from south Louisiana.65 That is an area roughly the
size of the State of Delaware or, closer to home, the size of Orleans
Parish, Jefferson Parish, St. Bernard Parish, Plaquemines Parish,
and St. John the Baptist Parish combined.66
There is a very practical, cascading consequence to this reality
of coastal land loss. Hurricanes strengthen over water and weaken
64. See, e.g., Cain Burdreau, Oil Canals’ Role in La. Losses Debated, ABC
NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=4162431, archived at http://perma
.cc/VAQ7-UMTX (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); John Tibbetts, Louisiana’s Wetlands:
A Lesson in Nature Appreciation, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS., Jan. 2006, at A40. Walt
Handelsman, the editorial cartoonist for The Advocate, portrayed the problem in the
March 30, 2014 edition of the newspaper in this manner:

See Walt Handelsman for March 30, 2014, THE ADVOCATE (June 11, 2014),
http://theadvocate.com/multimedia/walthandelsman/8756888-123/walt-handels
man-for-march-30, archived at http://perma.cc/NV8E-4KUY.
65. See, e.g., Russel L. Honore, Op-Ed., Safeguarding Louisiana’s Coastline,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/opinion/safeguard
ing-louisianas-coastline.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/28GX-998K; Press
Release, Nat’l Wetlands Research Ctr., Without Restoration, Coastal Land Loss to
Continue (May 21, 2003), http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/releases/pr03_004.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/75VU-HYH2.
66. U.S. Geological Survey, How Are Louisiana Wetlands Changing?,
USGS (June 2, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article
.asp?ID=2816#.VQn-xE1uiUk, archived at http://perma.cc/EE3Q-Z3NS.
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over land. The land in south Louisiana forms a vital buffer zone for
storm surge that constitutes the state’s first line of defense against
hurricane damage. As that buffer zone disappears, the last line of
defense—the levees of the Mississippi River—become further
exposed.
Those levees were built to withstand a 100-year storm, which
happens to be the lowest standard in the civilized world.67 Simply
put, the levees—and the cities they protect, such as New Orleans—
need the buffer zone to weaken storm surge before it strikes them.
Unrestored oil industry canals have destroyed that line of
protection and now imperil New Orleans and other critical areas of
the state.
This is well documented. Indeed, over the past 50 years,
numerous studies have been conducted to document coastal land
loss.68 Some of them have been either sponsored by industry or
conducted with the input and participation of industry partners.
One study, by the U.S. Geological Survey, concluded that
“[o]il and gas ranks the highest process of coastal land loss at
249,152 acres or 36.06% of the total loss.”69 Even the Louisiana
Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association agreed that “[the] effects of
canal development tend to be the overwhelming cause of wetland
losses.”70 The Coastal Protection and Restoration Commission also
posted the following statement on Governor Jindal’s website:
Canal dredging has had one of the most dramatic effects on
wetland growth and regeneration. In addition to directly
destroying marshes in the path of the canal, the plants are
unable to recolonize, and thus the marsh is unable to
67. See, e.g., Robert L. Reid, Defending New Orleans, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL
ENG’RS (Nov. 2013), http://www.arcadis-us.com/Content/ArcadisUS/docs/News
/AUS_DefendingNewOrleans_ASCE.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T6UL6FGW; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, LOUISIANA COASTAL PROTECTION AND
RESTORATION–FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT (June 2009); JOS DIKMAN, A DUTCH
PERSPECTIVE ON COASTAL LOUISIANA FLOOD RISK REDUCTION AND LANDSCAPE
STABILIZATION (Oct. 2007); NAT. ACADEMIES KECK CTR., GILBERT F. WHITE
NATIONAL FLOOD POLICY FORUM, REDUCING FLOOD LOSSES: IS THE 1% CHANCE
(100-YEAR) FLOOD STANDARD SUFFICIENT? (2004).
68. See SHEA PENLAND ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PROCESS
CLASSIFICATION OF COASTAL LAND LOSS BETWEEN 1932 AND 1990 IN THE
MISSISSIPPI RIVER DELTA PLAIN, SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA (2000), available
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2000/of00-418/ofr00-418.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/ACZ5-BMTL.
69. Id.
70. LA. UNIVS. MARINE CONSORTIUM ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF
PRODUCED WATER DISCHARGES IN COASTAL LOUISIANA: REPORT TO THE
LOUISIANA DIVISION OF THE MID -CONTINENT OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION (July
1989).
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regenerate itself. Once canals are dredged, most grow
larger as the sustainable areas of marsh subsequently
decrease.71
All of this calls into question whether we need oil companies
more than they need us. Indeed, the myth of oil company
dependency completely ignores that the resource bringing the oil
companies here belongs to us, not them. At the risk of stating the
obvious, the oil companies are here only because of oil. They are
not here to create jobs; they are here to make a profit producing a
resource belonging to the state and its citizens. That is a perfectly
legitimate motive, but it needs to be recognized for what it is.
Obviously, the oil companies will not be drilling wells after that
resource is exhausted.
B. Debunking Myth No. 2: “If we do anything the oil companies do
not like, they will leave.”
The second myth is that the oil companies will leave Louisiana
if we do anything they do not like. This is a corollary of the first
myth, which is that we need the oil companies more than they need
us. Those who unthinkingly repeat this myth often overlook
obvious facts.
Oil company profits come, obviously, from producing oil.
Profits are maximized by producing the best prospects—the lowhanging fruit. The low-hanging fruit in Louisiana was picked long
ago. After 60 to 70 years of production, the major oil companies
(e.g., Exxon, Amoco, and Texaco) began to leave Louisiana in the
1980s and 1990s in search of low-hanging fruit elsewhere. For
instance, Amoco sold most of its Louisiana interests to Apache in a
$515 million transaction in May of 1991.72

71. Shortly after the SLFPA-E lawsuit was filed, the statement was
modified to read: “Dredging canals for oil and gas exploration and pipelines
provided our nation with critical energy supplies, but these activities also took a
toll on the landscape, weakening marshes and allowing salt water to spread
higher into coastal basins.” Coastal Crisis, COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION
AUTH., http://coastal.la.gov/whats-at-stake/coastal-crisis/, archived at http://per
ma.cc/6H69-URQB (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). Although evidence of Governor
Jindal’s original statement has since been removed from his website, a copy of
the statement is on file with the author.
72. Apache to Double Reserves with Amoco Deal, OIL & GAS J. (May 13,
1991), http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-89/issue-19/in-this-issue/drilling
/apache-to-double-reserves-with-amoco-deal.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2FXT
-9CKW.
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That had nothing to do with litigation outcomes; indeed, the
watershed Corbello decision was years away.73 Rather, it was
driven by fundamental oilfield economics. When the price of oil is
high, drilling activity increases. When prospects are accessible and
cheap to drill, drilling activity in that locale increases. Easy
prospects are drilled before difficult prospects.
There is no better example of this than the Haynesville Shale
play in north Louisiana. When that prospect was first discovered,
leases were purchased at astronomical prices per acre.74 Landowners
became overnight multi-millionaires in the rush among the oil
companies to acquire acreage overlaying the shale. However, lease
prices dropped precipitously when wetter gas was discovered in
other shale formations in Pennsylvania, Alabama, Texas, and North
Dakota.
All of this indicates that displays of sympathy and hospitality
in the legislative and court systems play no role in exploration and
production decisions. The oil companies will come to Louisiana
and drill for its oil and gas as long as there are profitable amounts
of accessible oil and gas to produce. If not, all the “friendly” laws
and court decisions in the world will not influence the geologists
and petroleum engineers’ evaluations of prospects in the state.
C. Debunking Myth No. 3: “Greedy lawyers and frivolous lawsuits
are driving oil companies out of Louisiana.”
The third myth is most frequently cited by political leaders to
justify enacting “reforms” of oil company responsibility for
damage. Specifically, the mantra in Baton Rouge—one that was
first sounded during the tort reform movement in the 1990s―has
been that “greedy lawyers and frivolous lawsuits are driving oil
companies out of Louisiana.” The legal profession—both lawyers
and the courts—has served as a kind of whipping boy for the
Legislature in recent years. Noticeably, this theme has become
more pronounced as the number of lawyers in the Legislature has
declined.
This theme has been a drum beat of certain industry
representatives, the most vocal of whom has been Don Briggs, the
president of a group called the Louisiana Oil and Gas Association
73. See Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
74. See, e.g., Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 314
(5th Cir. 2012) (“In July 2008 Chesapeake Exploration LLC entered into an
agreement to purchase deep rights held by Peak Energy Corporation in certain
oil and gas leases in the Haynesville Shale formation, for the hefty sum of
$15,000 per acre.”).
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(LOGA).75 In marshalling support for legislative favors for the
industry, Mr. Briggs declared:
Plaintiff attorneys are slowly killing your economy. . . . The
personal injury and class action plaintiff’s bar is running
business out of your state. My perception and experience is
that the plaintiff’s bar owns the Louisiana judiciary.76
As a corollary of this, Mr. Briggs repeatedly declared that there was
a direct causal effect between lawsuits and declining rig counts.77
There was a day of reckoning for this myth. In late 2013, Mr.
Briggs and LOGA filed a lawsuit against the attorney general of
Louisiana seeking a declaration that his approval of a contract by
which the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East
hired lawyers to pursue coastal land loss claims against the oil
industry was illegal.78 Having voluntarily subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, Mr. Briggs was required to sit for a
deposition. Under questioning by one of the lawyers for the flood
protection authority, Mr. Briggs admitted under oath—over and
over—that he had no evidence or information that any oil company

75. See Don Briggs, LOGA, http://loga.la/loga/loga-staff/don-briggs/, archived
at http://perma.cc/DWT4-TKPY (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
76. Don G. Briggs, Legacy-Site Litigation: A Feeding Frenzy of Nuisance
Lawsuits, LOGA (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.loga.la/articles/040916.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/FML2-9MZG.
77. See, e.g., Don G. Briggs, As Legacy Lawsuit Count Rises, Rig Count
Falls, LA. RECORD (Mar. 13, 2014), http://louisianarecord.com/arguments
/259337-as-legacy-lawsuit-count-rises-rig-count-falls, archived at http://perma
.cc/4PSG-PXM6. Mr. Briggs’s son, Gifford Briggs, tours the state regurgitating
the same thing. See Billy Gunn, Industry Leaders Blame “Greedy Lawyers” for
Drop in Offshore Drilling, THE ADVOCATE (Mar. 20, 2014), http://theadvocate
.com/news/8622813-123/greedy-trial-lawyers-blamed-for, archived at http://per
ma.cc/8ZES-538K. In signing the most recent legislation sought by the industry,
Governor Jindal declared that the coastal land loss litigation brought by one of
the state’s flood protection agencies was “frivolous” and that he was “proud” to
sign a law directed to defeating that lawsuit because it “further improves
Louisiana’s legal environment by reducing unnecessary claims that burden
businesses so that we can bring even more jobs to our state.” Neela Banerjee,
Louisiana Governor Signs Law to Block Suits against Oil Industry, L.A. TIMES
(June 6, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-louisiana-lawsuit-jindal20140606-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4FD7-KLVZ. Award-winning
author John M. Barry, who helped initiate the lawsuit while on the board of the
flood protection authority (before being removed by Governor Jindal),
responded: “Is there a single person in Louisiana who believes the governor is
putting the state’s interest ahead of his personal ambition?” Id.
78. The lawsuit was filed by LOGA in the 19th Judicial District Court in
East Baton Rouge Parish on December 13, 2013. See La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc.
v. Caldwell, No. 626,798 (La. 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. 2013).
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had ever left Louisiana or failed to drill a single oil or gas well
because of the threat of lawsuits or the legal climate.79
Despite this well-publicized setback,80 Mr. Briggs’s theme
continues to enjoy support from an organization called the American
Tort Reform Foundation, which publishes an annual ranking that
usually lists Louisiana as among states it characterizes as “judicial
hellholes” of the United States.81 Leaving aside that this
organization does not identify its constituents or funding sources, its
only criterion for qualifying a state as a “hellhole” appears to be its
79. Consider the following excerpts from Mr. Briggs’s sworn testimony:
Q: Do you have any evidence that any oil company considers the
Louisiana legal climate in deciding whether they will drill for oil and
gas in Louisiana?
A: No.
Q: Is it your opinion that oil and gas companies are leaving Louisiana
because of the threat of lawsuits?
A: Yes.
Q: Which oil companies have left Louisiana because of lawsuits?
A: I don’t know.
Q: Do you have any facts or data to support your opinion?
A: No.
...
Q: Do you know of any oil companies that specifically have not drilled
because of the legal climate?
A: No.
...
Q: Give us a name of an oil company that has refused to do business in
Louisiana because of lawsuits.
A: I don’t know any.
Q: You don’t have any facts or data anywhere else?
A: No.
...
Q: Can you name any wells that were not drilled because of lawsuits?
A: No.
Dep. of Donald G. Briggs at 47–48, 62, 63, Caldwell, available at http://www
.theind.com/extras/Official-Transcript-Briggs-Depo.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/RG7P-ARRJ.
80. Briggs was roasted in the media, which understandably felt betrayed to
learn that the propaganda he had been feeding them over the years had no
factual basis. See, e.g., Clancy DuBos, Briggs’ Pathetic Performance, GAMBIT
(Feb. 27, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://www.bestofneworleans.com/blogofneworleans
/archives/2014/02/27/briggs-pathetic-performance, archived at http://perma.cc
/5FHZ-VDXR; James Gill, Industry Spokesman Doesn’t Worry about the Facts,
THE ADVOCATE (June 12, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/columnists/849640055/james-gill-industry-spokesman-doesn’t, archived at http://perma.cc/P8VAPHB6.
81. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2014–2015, at 3, 4–5
(2014), available at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2014
/12/JudicialHellholes-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NQ7L-QU4C.
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subjective determination that “judges in civil cases systematically
apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced
manner, generally to the disadvantage of defendants.”82
Apparently, the bar for becoming a judicial “hellhole” is set rather
low: there is no evidence of any other criterion, such as whether
there was any identifiable error in either the evidence or the law in
any given court decision.
The industry continued its attack on lawyers and the courts by
enlisting the aid of David Dismukes, now the executive director of
the LSU Center for Energy Studies. Dismukes authored an essay in
February 2012 entitled “The Impact of Legacy Lawsuits on
Conventional Oil and Gas Drilling in Louisiana.”83 This publication
essentially repeated LOGA’s charge that lawsuits by landowners for
the contamination of their property were discouraging oil companies
from drilling in the state.84
However, e-mails obtained from LSU under state public
records laws revealed that Exxon had furnished the alleged data for
the essay, had apparently instructed Dismukes on how to present
the data, and had retained editorial approval of the essay.85 Another
e-mail from Dismukes to his assistant complained about feeling
pressure from Exxon and Chevron and wanting to get them “off
my back.”86 When attorneys attempted to subpoena Dismukes to
depose him about his essay, he ran his car into the process server’s
vehicle while attempting to avoid being served.87
82. Id. at 2.
83. DAVID E. DISMUKES, THE IMPACT OF LEGACY LAWSUITS ON
CONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DRILLING IN LOUISIANA, LSU CTR. FOR ENERGY
STUDIES (2012), available at http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/files/images/presentations
/2012/DISMUKES_LEGACY_RPT_02-28-12_FINAL.pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/6S2Q-87VN.
84. Id. at 3–17.
85. See Patrick Flanagan, Big Oil’s Behind-the-Scenes Role in LSU’s
“Legacy Lawsuit” Study, ABIZ (Mar. 9, 2014), http://theind.com/article-16499big-oil’s-behind-the-scenes-role-in-lsu’s-‘legacy-lawsuit’-study.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/WH6W-HLAQ.
86. Deanna Narveson, LSU Professor’s Study Disputed, DAILY REVEILLE
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.lsureveille.com/news/lsu-professor-s-study-disputed
/article_46f3bada-af14-11e3-a8c3-0017a43b2370.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/PJB7-6VEX.
87. Id. The accident report of the Baton Rouge Police Department is dated
March 20, 2012, and a copy is on file with the author. Despite its evident flaws
and biased data, at least one student commentator recently discussed Dismukes’
essay with apparent approval. Johnson, supra note 33, at 672–73. This Comment
uncritically accepts and reiterates the myth that the “reforms” of oilfield
contamination litigation were motivated by a desire to deter frivolous lawsuits.
Id. at 682. It was apparently beyond the scope of that Comment to examine
whether the underlying factual premise for that assertion was valid.
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Aside from proving that confronting myths is not for the faint of
heart, this kind of scapegoating is not new. Indeed, spokesmen of
the oil industry have long reverted to the “greedy lawyers/frivolous
lawsuits” refrain whenever a legal outcome is not to their liking.
When the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided Corbello in 2003,88
the industry hired LSU economist Loren C. Scott to tour the state,
educate civic groups, and discuss the allegedly catastrophic effects
of the decision. As part of his presentations, Scott warned a Houma
audience that the Corbello decision had “really hammered your
area.”89
Of course, the sky did not fall after Corbello. To the contrary,
drilling permits in Louisiana—which are a matter of public
record—rose for six consecutive years after the Supreme Court’s
ruling. Indeed, within two years of the decision, the number of
drilling permits issued annually had actually doubled over the
number they had been in the year before Corbello was handed
down.90 Not surprisingly, the record number of drilling permits
issued in Louisiana from 2005 to 2010 coincided with record

The rhetoric of “frivolous lawsuits” camouflages the real concern of those
who seek to avoid being sued. Few defendants concern themselves with
frivolous lawsuits. Certainly, none of the tort or oil and gas reformers is ever
able to cite a frivolous lawsuit that was successful. The real concern, obviously,
is that non-frivolous, or meritorious, lawsuits will be brought. Those are the
ones that general genuine legal exposure or risk.
It also bears noting that landowners who sue oil companies bear the burden
of proving their claims and that lawsuits against oil companies for destruction of
formations, contamination, or coastal land loss must be supported by objective
scientific and engineering evidence that meets the competency and reliability
requirements of evidence law. See LA. CODE EVID. art. 702 (2015); State v.
Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993). Unlike an automobile collision, oilfield cases
cannot be won with subjective eyewitness recollections about who ran the red
light. And while the reformers call for laws to prohibit “frivolous” lawsuits,
none seem aware that a law already exists—and has since 1989—imposing
sanctions against parties and lawyers who bring frivolous lawsuits. See LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 863 (2015).
88. Corbello v. Iowa Prod. Co., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
89. Jason Mayo, Economist: Lawsuits Hurt Houma Job Growth, DAILY
COMET.COM (June 16, 2004, 11:39 AM), http://www.dailycomet.com
/article/20040616/BUSINESS/406160308, archived at http://perma.cc/QU9VP8C6. See VERON, SHELL GAME, supra note 10. Professor Scott was also paid to
perform an economic study proving that the oil industry is a “giant economic
engine” for the state. LOREN C. SCOTT, THE ENERGY SECTOR: A GIANT
ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR THE LOUISIANA ECONOMY (1996).
90. That was the experience not only in Louisiana, but also in Texas and
Arkansas. See Veron, Oilfield, supra note 15, at 16 and authorities cited therein.
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prices for oil, proving that oil and gas activities are dictated by the
price of the commodity, not litigation outcomes.91
CONCLUSION: DOES BIGFOOT EXIST?
Psychologists have long contended from studies that people
tend to believe what they want to believe.92 In the extreme, legal
scholars have referred to this condition as “deliberate ignorance.”93
Thus, the answer to whether Bigfoot exists presumably depends to
some extent on the predisposed eye of the beholder, something the
cynic might say requires a fair amount of gullibility. However, one
of the underlying purposes of our adversarial legal system is to test
assertions of fact instead of accepting them uncritically. Viewed in
this manner, the record does not support the mythology of oil and
gas in Louisiana any more than it does the existence of Bigfoot. At
the very least, confronting the false premises for these myths
forces those who embrace them to re-evaluate their position or to
admit the real reasons behind it.

91. Speaking at the LSU Law Center’s 57th Mineral Law Institute on April
15, 2010, DNR Secretary Scott Angelle was unabashedly enthusiastic about the
record numbers of drilling permits being issued in the state: “Well, what a heck
of a run it’s been for all of us over the last five years. . . . Without question, it is
time to end the ‘either/or’ debate on energy policy versus the environment.”
Scott Angelle, Sec’y of La. Dep’t of Natural Res., Comments to LSU Law
Center’s 57th Mineral Law Inst. (Apr. 15, 2010), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index
.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&aid=29, archived at http://perma.cc/3KERNN3L.
92. See, e.g., Anthony Bastardi, Eric Luis Uhlmann, & Lee Ross, Wishful
Thinking: Belief, Desire, and the Motivated Evaluation of Scientific Evidence,
ASS’N FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. (Apr. 2011), http://socialjudgments.com/docs
/Bastardi_Uhlmann_and_Ross_Wishful_Thinking.2011.pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/J3AH-DK4H.
93. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance
as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191 (1990).

